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Abstract 
Macroeconomic policy in Latin America underwent significant changes in the late nineties. Brazil 
is an outstanding example: inflation targeting was introduced in 1999 and a new fiscal policy 
framework was set up in 2000 with the Fiscal Responsibility Law. However, two elements of the 
Brazilian economy constrained the apparently state-of-the-art macroeconomic policy 
framework: the composition of public debt and the structure of the banking system. This paper 
discusses why macroeconomic policies were restricted by those factors and how they have 
evolved differently. The structure of public debt, characterised by indexation, short-term 
maturities and short US dollar positions, imposed significant constraints on macroeconomic 
policies during the 2000s. Nevertheless, these vulnerabilities were gradually overcome and the 
composition of public debt has remained stable in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. At 
the same time, the structure of the banking system was characterised by credit segmentation 
and high interest spreads, and these characteristics are still present today. These features have 
become key elements in understanding current macroeconomic developments, credit dynamics 
and the economic policy stance.  
Keywords: public debt, central banking, credit policies, Brazil. 
JEL Classification: H30, E58, E.63. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
La conducción de las políticas macroeconómicas experimentó importantes cambios en América 
Latina a finales de los noventa. Brasil es un ejemplo notable de aquellos, al introducirse el 
objetivo de inflación como marco de política monetaria en 1999, y un nuevo marco fiscal en 
2000, con la ley de responsabilidad fiscal. Sin embargo, hay dos elementos que en la práctica 
restringieron este marco de política macroeconómica: la composición de la deuda pública y la 
estructura del sistema bancario. Este trabajo expone la importancia que tuvieron estos factores y 
cómo han evolucionado de modo distinto desde entonces. La estructura de la deuda pública, 
caracterizada por la indexación, el corto plazo de los vencimientos y una posición corta en 
dólares, supuso una importante restricción a las políticas macroeconómicas durante la década 
del 2000. Sin embargo, estos problemas fueron superados de modo gradual, y la composición 
de la deuda pública no se deterioró tras la crisis financiera global. El segundo factor relevante era 
la estructura del sistema bancario, que se caracterizaba por la segmentación y los elevados 
márgenes de los intereses de préstamos sobre depósitos. Estos elementos han persistido, y se 
han convertido en elementos clave para entender los desarrollos macroeconómicos actuales, la 
política crediticia y el tono de la política monetaria. 
Palabras clave: deuda pública, banca central, políticas crediticias, Brasil. 
Códigos JEL: H30, E58, E63.  
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1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, Latin American economies have witnessed sustained economic growth 
—boosted partially by the commodities boom and vast foreign capital inflows— and a general 
improvement in their economic policy frameworks. These developments, to some extent, 
supported the region, helping it come through the global financial and economic crisis 
successfully. In particular, some countries were able to rid themselves of the burdens that 
constrained economic policy management in the past (i.e. the “original sin” and the “fear of 
floating”) and apply countercyclical policy measures during the shock. Notwithstanding this 
progress, Latin America still exhibits important structural impediments to increases in growth 
potential, as the low rate of productivity growth in most countries testifies.  
Brazil is a remarkable example of such improvements and limitations and constitutes 
a natural case study. Macroeconomic policy in Brazil underwent significant change in the late 
1990s. Inflation targeting was introduced as the monetary policy framework in 1999, replacing 
the previous framework of the Plano Real, which had been designed as an exchange rate 
mechanism for stabilising inflation. The new inflation targeting regime was accompanied by a 
de jure commitment to exchange rate flexibility.1 In addition, a new fiscal policy framework 
was set up in 2000 with the Fiscal Responsibility Law, aimed at imposing discipline on public 
finances at all levels of administration (central government, states and municipalities). The Law 
contributed to an improvement in fiscal accounts and helped sustain net debt dynamics, 
although it was not a structural rule and did not prevent structural surplus/deficit. 
However, the Brazilian economy had very specific features which constrained this 
apparently state-of-the-art macroeconomic framework. Two features, in particular, stand 
out: public debt composition and the structure of the banking system. This paper 
discusses how macroeconomic policies were restricted by those factors and how they 
have evolved differently. The public debt structure imposed significant limitations on 
macroeconomic policies during the 2000s. Its main vulnerabilities were indexation, short-
term maturities and short US dollar positions. Nevertheless, these vulnerabilities were 
gradually overcome during that period and the composition of public debt has remained 
stable in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. By contrast, the structure of the banking 
system, characterised by credit segmentation and high interest spreads, remains 
unchanged. All these features constitute key elements in understanding current 
macroeconomic developments and credit dynamics.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how monetary 
and fiscal policies were constrained for a long period of time by the structure of public debt. 
Traditionally, internal debt was characterised by short-term maturities and widespread 
indexation. Even if internal debt dollarisation was not high for regional standards, the public 
sector had a short US dollar position, i.e. external debt was higher than the holdings of 
international reserves. Those features were a significant source of vulnerability and 
constrained the monetary policy framework. Monetary policy tightening implied, as a by-
product, an increase in public debt funding costs, while exchange rate depreciations, 
otherwise a channel for dampening negative external shocks, could become contractive, on 
account of impaired debt dynamics due to the currency mismatch between FX assets and 
                                                                          
1. See Bogdanski et al. (2000) and (2001) for a detailed description of the inflation targeting regime that replaced the 
exchange rate mechanism for stabilising inflation under the Plano Real. 
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liabilities. Therefore, overcoming these constraints was a key prerequisite for conducting 
countercyclical macroeconomic policies.  
Section 3 discusses how the banking system had, and indeed still has, a number of 
features which have imposed stringent limitations on standard macroeconomic policy. One of 
the most defining issues is the segmentation of credit allocation: only a fraction of credit is 
non-earmarked, i.e. freely allocated by banks. The rest is earmarked by a complex system in 
which the large public development bank Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e 
Social (BNDES) has a prominent role. Earmarked credit implies channelling savings to certain 
sectors where credit provision is supposedly lacking due to market failures. However, beyond 
a given point, this system implies a crowding out of the private banking system. The high 
banking spreads between the lending and deposit rates of non-earmarked credit are another 
key issue. Banking spreads depend on a number of factors, including large compulsory and 
unremunerated reserve requirements, but also the burden imposed by the earmarking 
system. Considering these features of the banking system, we assess the room for 
conducting countercyclical macroeconomic policies in 2002, 2008 and 2013.  
Additionally, Brazil’s banking system has conditioned the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The short-term interest rate, which is the standard monetary 
policy tool, has little impact on the dynamics of earmarked credit. In turn, the earmarked 
credit interest rate is linked to the “official” long-term interest rate fixed by the National 
Monetary Council. Moreover, earmarked credit may be stimulated by administrative 
measures and the direct allocation of resources by BNDES, areas of decision-making 
which lie beyond the scope of the central bank. Finally, the central bank has ample room 
for conducting quantitative monetary policy, e.g. tightening reserve requirements, with a 
strong impact on non-earmarked lending rates. Indeed, quasi-fiscal expansions related to 
public credit policies are also essential to assess the fiscal policy stance. In this sense, the 
credit expansion of recent years is directly related to policies aimed at stimulating housing 
and long-term investment.  
Finally, Section 4 presents the main conclusions.  
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2 Inflation targeting and public debt composition 
Public debt had important vulnerabilities in the early 2000s, which imposed significant 
constraints on macroeconomic policies. These vulnerabilities stemmed from the composition of 
public debt, rather than from its volume. In fact, the ratio of public debt to GDP was relatively 
low by international standards, amounting to 52% of GDP in 1999.2 Debt composition improved 
gradually during the following decade and its main vulnerabilities were overcome. Such 
improvements were instrumental to Brazil withstanding the financial shock during the global 
financial crisis, and the composition of public debt has remained stable ever since. 
2.1 Public debt structure as a constraint on macroeconomic policy in the 2000s 
The composition of public debt was an important source of vulnerability in Brazil in the early 
2000s for two reasons. First, a significant fraction of internal debt was exposed to rollover 
risks, since it was indexed to short-term interest rates or had a short maturity.3 This is 
apparent in Table 1, which disaggregates debt across maturities and instruments. The bias 
towards short-term maturities was particularly significant for fixed interest rate debt: all fixed 
interest rate debt matured in less than one year. Debt at longer maturities was fixed at floating 
interest rates or indexed to inflation. Internal debt was biased towards short-term maturities: 
55% of total debt matured in less than one year and public debt over five years accounted for 
only 14.9% of total debt. Moreover, fixed interest rate debt represented only 9% of total debt, 
the rest being indexed either to short-term interest rates, inflation or the foreign exchange 
rate. The public debt structure was a consequence of decades of high inflation, when 
indexation and shortening of maturities protected the real value of savings from inflation. 
 
                                                                          
2. Internal (domestic) debt represented 38% of GDP while external (international) debt accounted for 14% of GDP. 
Internal or domestic debt refers to debt issued in Brazil. External or international debt refers to debt issued abroad. 
3. Bevilaqua and García (1999) discuss how the prominent role of domestic banks as investors in public debt 
contributed to mitigate these risks somewhat. 
Table 1: Internal debt as of end 1999
A: As % GDP
Less than one year 1 yr < x < 2 yr 2 yr < x < 3 yr 3 yr < x < 4 yr 4 yr < x < 5 yr x > 5 yr Total
Fixed interest rate 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 
Floating interest rate 12.7 5.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 2.6 21.8 
Inflation 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.4 2.1 
Indexed to exchange rate 4.6 3.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 8.7 
Other 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 1.7 2.1 
Total 21.0 8.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 5.7 38.2 
Source: National Treasury, Banco de España.
B: As % Total Debt 
Less than one year 1 yr < x < 2 yr 2 yr < x < 3 yr 3 yr < x < 4 yr 4 yr < x < 5 yr x > 5 yr Total
Fixed interest rate 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0
Floating interest rate 33.2 13.1 1.5 1.3 1.3 6.7 57.0
Inflation 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.5 3.6 5.6
Indexed to exchange rate 12.1 9.2 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.2 22.8
Other 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0 4.4 5.6
Total 54.9 23.3 2.5 2.3 2.1 14.9 100.0
Source: National Treasury, Banco de España.
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Second, the public sector was a net debtor in foreign currency and therefore 
exchange rate depreciations had a potential negative impact on debt dynamics. Although 
financial dollarisation was not as widespread as in other countries of the region, debt exposed 
to exchange rate fluctuations —the total amount of internal debt and external debt indexed to 
exchange rates— reached 20% of GDP in 2000. So large was it that it surpassed the low 
holdings of international reserves.4
The macroeconomic framework introduced at the end of the Plano Real, based on 
inflation targeting and exchange rate flexibility, was limited by this public debt structure. 
Inflation targeting was constrained by widespread debt indexation, since public debt was 
prominently short-term and indexed to interest rates. Then, as a by-product, monetary policy 
tightening implied an increase in debt service. Furthermore, exchange rate flexibility was 
restricted by the public sector net debtor position in foreign currency. Exchange rate 
depreciations had negative valuation effects and an adverse impact on public debt dynamics, 
so exchange rates could not float freely to dampen external shocks without impairing public 
debt. In a nutshell, macroeconomic policies aimed at mitigating inflationary pressures or 
absorbing negative shocks could lead to very adverse net debt dynamics.   
 As for the composition of external debt, the bulk was 
contractual debt, i.e. debt with international financial institutions (IMF, BID and Paris Club) and 
restructured debt (Brady bonds). Sovereign debt issuance had increased after the 
introduction of the Plano Real, although access to external markets remained precarious.  
Moreover, the structure of public debt could worsen quickly during financial stress, 
as happened in 2002. Then, political uncertainty during the run-up to the presidential 
elections triggered a reversal of foreign capital inflows, a significant increase in sovereign debt 
spreads and a sharp exchange rate depreciation. The problems were aggravated by the 
gradual shortening of maturities and the reduction in fixed interest debt (see Chart 1).  
 
The central bank tightened monetary policy in response to these developments, 
although it failed to prevent the marked exchange rate depreciation, which had significant 
negative balance sheet effects. Moreover, interest rate payments rocketed as monetary policy 
                                                                            
4. During the years of high inflation, Brazilian banks used to offer domestic currency deposits, perfectly indexed, as a 
way of preserving the real value of savings, investing the proceeds in indexed domestic currency bonds. See Goldfajn et 
al. (2003), Garcia (1996), or Bevilaqua and Garcia (2012). 
CHART 1. IMPACT OF 2002 TURMOIL ON PUBLIC DEBT STRUCTURE
Source: BCB, Tesouro Nacional
Note: SELIC is the official short-term interest rate. 
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tightening implied an increase in funding costs. Therefore, the ratio of net debt to GDP 
increased in 2002 by 8.4 pp, in spite of the primary surplus posted by the public sector: a 
negative valuation effect implied an increase in debt of 9.9 pp of GDP, while interest 
payments amounted to 7.7 pp of GDP.  
Financial instability eased after October, and the exchange rate appreciated, 
contributing to the stabilisation of net debt dynamics. However, interest payments remained 
high and the worsening of the public debt structure continued.5 The 2002 episode was a 
relevant test for the inflation targeting regime and underscored the importance of addressing 
public debt vulnerabilities. Overcoming those problems was essential to improving 
macroeconomic stability and it gradually became a policy priority for the economic authorities.  
2.2 Improvements in public debt composition  
Public debt composition experienced two remarkable improvements in the period 2003-07. 
The first was the shift in the composition of the gross public debt structure, which started as 
far back as 1999. Chart 2 plots the percentage of short-term debt along the vertical (y) axis, 
while the percentage of fixed interest rate debt is indicated by the horizontal (x) axis. Short-
term debt and indexed debt decreased gradually and, consequently, so did the rollover risk. 
The amount of floating interest rate debt halved during this period, with a significant increase 
in fixed interest debt. Debt maturities lengthened on account of a reduction in short-term debt 
and a gradual increase in long-term debt.  
 
The second change was the dedollarisation of public debt during that period. The 
public sector’s foreign currency position gradually improved until it became a net creditor. 
This change was driven by a reduction in foreign currency debt and also by a significant 
increase in the central bank’s international reserves. The first was a consequence of active 
debt management by authorities, which moved towards local currency debt in an attempt to 
                                                                          
5. See Bevilaqua and Loyo (2005) or García (2006) for a comprehensive description of the problems faced by inflation 
targeting since its implementation until 2005. Inflation climbed higher owing to the exchange rate pass-through and 
inflation expectations overshot. Given the magnitude of the deterioration, the central bank raised the inflation targets for 
2003 and 2004 to 8.5% and 5.5% respectively. Monetary policy was further tightened in early 2003, but inflation 
remained above target in 2002 and 2003. 
CHART 2. INTERNAL PUBLIC DEBT COMPOSITION
Source: Tesouro Nacional.
Note: The chart depicts short-term (<12 months) and fixed rate debt over total debt. Monthly data, since 2000. 
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reduce the vulnerabilities associated with excessive foreign currency debt. As shown by 
Acevedo et al. (2007), in a context of currency appreciation such as the one recorded in the 
period 2003-07, policy-makers had an incentive to maintain or increase the share of foreign 
currency debt, as this would have enabled a more rapid reduction of public debt to GDP 
ratios. But, in Brazil, authorities put the long-term benefits of debt structure improvement 
(contingent on financial turbulence when the exchange rate sharply depreciates) before the 
short-term benefit of a debt/GDP reduction. Consequently, debt indexed to the exchange 
rate and external debt shrank.  
Moreover, international reserves increased substantially during this period. Reserve 
holdings amounted to USD 180 billion (13% of GDP) at the end of 2007, well above the USD 
37 billion (6% of GDP) at the end of 1999. The increase in international reserves was driven by 
central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market, the purpose of which was to 
moderate currency appreciation pressures stemming from large capital inflows. Once the 
public sector had a long foreign currency position, any exchange rate depreciation reduced 
net debt. Accordingly, there was more room to conduct expansionary macroeconomic 
policies during financial stress. Both changes were, to a large extent, the consequence of the 
active policies of the Treasury. Box 1 discusses the policies intended to improve the internal 
and external debt composition, such as the lengthening of maturities and the reduction in FX 
indexation. 
 
CHART 3. DEDOLLARISATON OF PUBLIC DEBT. FX ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Source: BCB, Tesouro Nacional.
Note: The chart shows the dedollarisation of public debt. Foreign currency debt includes internal and external debt in 
foreign currency. Foreign currency assets include international reserves, with a negative sign. Net foreign currency debt is 
defined as the difference between foreign currency liabilities and assets.
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BOX 1. DEBT MANAGEMENT IN BRAZIL 
In this box we review the active Treasury debt management strategy to improve internal and 
external debt composition. 
Internal debt management. The internal debt structure was characterised by short-
term maturities and widespread indexation to floating interest rates and inflation. The 
Treasury´s long-term goal was the reduction in financing costs in the long term, subject to 
acceptable levels of rollover and market and operational risks. The Treasury established a 
number of intermediate objectives: i) the lengthening of the average maturity; ii) the 
improvement of maturity profiles, with a particular focus on short-term debt; iii) the gradual 
increase in fixed interest rate debt or debt indexed to inflation, and a reduction of debt at 
floating interest rates; and iv) the development of a term structure for public debt. Since 
2001 the Treasury has published an annual financing plan (Plano Anual do Financiamento).  
 
The Treasury estimated an optimal debt structure model (Treasury, 2013), in which it 
establishes ceilings and floors on the different debt instruments for 2013. For instance, fixed 
income debt should amount to between 41% and 45% of total internal debt; debt indexed to 
inflation should fluctuate between 34% and 37%; debt at floating interest rates should range 
between 14% and 19%; and, finally, debt indexed to the exchange rate should stand between 
3% and 5% of total debt. This optimal debt composition is considered a medium-term 
benchmark and should take into account debt maturities. In the long term, the Federal Public 
Debt (FPD) Profile is defined by indicators with tolerance margins of +/-2%. For instance, fixed 
rate debt and inflation linked debt should amount to 45% and 35% of total debt respectively, 
whereas floating rate debt and exchange rate debt should account for 15% and 5%, 
respectively. There is also a limit of 20% for bonds maturing in 12 months. The internal debt 
structure moved towards this profile over the period, as Chart 1 shows. Indeed, the proportion 
of inflation and exchange linked FPD has already reached the proposed limits. 
External debt management. In the mid-1990s, external debt comprised a) 
contractual debt with international financial institutions (IMF, BID and Paris Club); b) 
restructured debt or Brady bonds; and iii) sovereign debt issued in external financial 
markets. In recent years the Treasury has actively managed external debt to achieve 
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different objectives. For instance, in order to reduce restructured debt and gain access to 
external markets at a low cost of financing, the Treasury conducted repurchases of 
restructured debt (comprising Brady bonds), replacing it with sovereign debt issued in 
financial markets which did not have the stigma of the former. After a number of operations, 
the last Brady bonds were redeemed in 2006, with international reserves used to finance the 
purchases. Once this had been achieved, the Treasury conducted operations to further 
improve the composition of external debt in terms of maturities and prices, constructing an 
interest rate curve for external debt, with qualitative issuances, from 2006 onwards. For 
instance, in 2007, a successful exchange offer swapped debt maturing in 2020, 2024, 2027 
and 2030 for debt maturing in 2037; and early redemptions of external debt were also 
conducted, in contexts of improving access to financial markets (for instance, the tender 
offer for early redemption conducted in 2007). Finally, the Treasury launched a programme 
of issuance in domestic currency (real) in external markets in 2005. Table 1 summarises the 
main operations in 2005 and 2006.  
 
All in all, the public debt structure changed dramatically during the period: internal 
debt shifted closer to the optimal debt structure, given the desired combination of return 
risk, while external debt registered a reduction of restructured debt, a gradual increase in 
sovereign debt and other qualitative improvements. 
 
2.3 Macroeconomic policy during financial shocks: the importance of the public 
debt structure  
The global economic and financial crisis of 2008 had a strong impact on the Brazilian economy 
through a contraction in external demand and disruptions in financial markets.6
The main features of the financial shocks of 2002 and 2008, and the latest episode 
of 2012-13, are depicted in Chart 4.  
 From this 
perspective, the impact was not significantly different from previous episodes of financial stress, 
such as the sudden drying up of foreign capital inflows in 2002, and indeed it could have been 
more severe, since the depressed global demand limited the possibilities of adjustment through 
the external sector and depreciation. Nevertheless, its economic consequences were by far less 
dramatic and more short-lived. The key difference between those episodes is that, in 2008, 
macroeconomic policies could adopt a decisive countercyclical stance, partly due to the 
important improvements in the public debt structure made over previous years, but also to the 
build-up of fiscal and monetary space and credibility.   
                                                                            
6. For a detailed description of the 2002 episode, see García (2008). Mesquita and Torós (2010) discuss the central 
bank’s response to the 2008 crisis. Gallego et al. (2010) provide an analysis of the resilience of Latin America to the last 
crisis.  
Selec ted operations of debt management in Brazil, 2005 and 200 6
Type of debt Operation Date
Contractual IMF Early redemption of the debt with the IMF, total amount 20.4 bn (2005) 2005
Retructured Brady bonds Exchange offer of C-bonds for A-bonds, total amount 4.5 bn (2005) 2005
Early redemption of Brady Bonds, total amount 6.6 bn (2005 and 2006) 2006
Paris Club Early redemption debt with the Paris Club, total amount 1.7 bn (2006) 2006
Sovereign Bond issuance in domestic currency in external markets (Global BRL 2016), amount 4.9 bn 2005
Redemption of debt maturing in 2007, 2009 & 2010, to improve maturity profile 2006
Exchange offer bond G2037 for bonds G2020, 2024, 2027, and 2030, total amount 3.7 bn 2006
Source: National Treasury, own elaboration.
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All indicators suggest that the shocks were more sizable in the first two episodes 
than in the last one. Net capital inflows suffered a severe contraction (Panel A); sovereign 
spreads increased (Panel B) and the exchange rate depreciated sharply at the onset of each 
event (Panel C), although in relative terms the increase was higher and more sustained in 
2002.7
Macroeconomic policies differed in the three episodes, as depicted in Chart 5. 
Macroeconomic policies were very contractive in 2002, very expansive in 2008 and mildly 
contractive in 2012-13. The reason lies mainly with the impact of exchange rate depreciation 
on public debt. In 2002 the country was a net debtor in foreign currency, and the exchange 
rate depreciation had a negative valuation effect on debt (Chart 5, Panel A).  
 Exchange rate depreciation in 2008 acted partially as a buffer —in a context of 
reduced global demand— and helped absorb the financial shock. But the plunge in the 
exchange rate was not without risk and the central bank intervened strongly in the foreign 
exchange market to mitigate it. The main reason behind the relative strength of the exchange 
rate during the last episode was the short-lived nature of the sudden halt in foreign capital 
inflows. Lastly, in 2002 inflation rose substantially, in part as a consequence of the pass-
through effect; but in 2008 inflation remained subdued and within the central bank’s target 
band. The external shock of 2012-13 seems, in comparison, rather small, although net capital 
inflows decreased and sovereign spreads widened, albeit without reaching previous stress 
levels. However, there was less room to conduct countercyclical macroeconomic policies 
than in 2008 —even though the public debt structure did not deteriorate— since the fiscal 
space was rather limited, inflation pressures constrained any monetary policy loosening, 
credit policies were under scrutiny and the increasing current account deficit exacerbated 
external vulnerabilities. 
                                                                            
7. A possible explanation is that, in 2008, Brazil was impacted by a truly exogenous development: the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers. In 2002, and to some extent in 2012, the problem was a protracted loss of confidence, very much 
related to domestic developments. 
CHART 4. FINANCIAL SHOCKS: 2002, 2008 and 2013
        Source: BCB, Banco de España
        Note: Events start in March 2002, September 2008 and April 2013, respectively.
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This triggered an increase in the risk premium. Public debt increased by 10 pp, 
reaching 63% of GDP and reducing the room to conduct countercyclical macroeconomic 
policies. The reverse happened in 2008, when Brazil had overcome the currency mismatch. 
The exchange rate depreciation led to a positive valuation effect. Public debt improved from 
42% to 38% of GDP. The long foreign currency position, which had been a drag on the 
reduction in net debt during the exchange rate appreciation period in 2007, became a source 
of stability.  
Therefore, monetary policy was tightened in 2002 to halt the outflow of capital and to 
reverse the exchange rate depreciation. The central bank increased the interest rate by 300 
bp in May 2002 and again by 400 bp in August 2002, to leave it standing at 26.5% (see Chart 
5, Panel C). In 2008 preventing exchange rate depreciation was no longer a policy target in 
itself, as net debt had improved. Monetary policy was eased in the aftermath of the global 
economic and financial crisis to alleviate the impact of the global crisis on the real economy.   
The room to conduct fiscal and quasi-fiscal policies was also very different. In 2002 
fiscal policy was constrained by the large increase in public debt. This was in stark contrast 
with the response in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, when the Treasury adopted a very 
expansive fiscal stance. Direct fiscal expansion remained modest, but authorities pursued an 
aggressive quasi-fiscal policy, the main element of which was the credit policy of BNDES, the 
national development bank, and other public banks. The large resources granted by the 
Treasury to BNDES allowed significant disbursements of up to BRL 180 billion in the year 
after the crisis, as shown in Chart 5, Panel D. These resources were instrumental in 
maintaining credit growth to the industrial sector and underscored the countercyclical impact 
of this instrument.  
Macroeconomic policies seemed also constrained by exchange rate developments 
in 2013 (along with persistent inflation pressures, previous fiscal deterioration and a change in 
international investors’ perception of the country). The reason was not the impact of the 
CHART 5: MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
Source: BCB, Tesouro Nacional.
Note: Events start in March 2002, September 2008 and April 2013, respectively.
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external shock on public debt dynamics, since net public debt decreased due to the creditor 
condition of the public sector in foreign currency. However, the protracted exchange rate 
depreciation risked spiralling out of control, introduced further inflationary pressures and could 
eventually lead to further losses in confidence. The significant impact on exchange rates, the 
policy responses and the change in the international mood might be more related to a critical 
assessment of previous economic policies or concerns about unexpected pockets of financial 
vulnerabilities, such as non-financial corporations’ large issuances (Turner, 2014, and Shin, 
2013). Nevertheless, market sentiment towards Brazil has improved more recently and the 
exchange rate has appreciated, finally stabilising at a comfortable level, mainly due to the 
central bank’s decisive action in tightening monetary policy to curb inflation and intervening in 
FX markets to support the currency. 
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3 Monetary policy, credit policies, and the banking system structure   
The structure of the banking system imposed other constraints on Brazil’s macroeconomic 
policy framework, as some of its features had important implications for the process of credit 
expansion, and the implementation of monetary policy   
Two key features in this respect were the dual system of credit allocation — 
earmarked and non-earmarked credit — and the segmentation of lenders between public and 
private institutions, both with significant weight. Currently, despite the financial deepening 
experienced by Brazil over the last decade, a significant proportion of credit remains 
earmarked by administrative measures, with public institutions playing a prominent role. That 
proportion has increased due to policy-makers’ use of earmarked credit as a countercyclical 
tool during the global financial crisis. It is also worth noting that the evolution of earmarked 
credit and its cost are independent of monetary policy decisions concerning the official short-
term interest rate. Lastly, banking spreads between non-earmarked loans and deposits are 
extremely large and depend on a wide range of factors; indeed, some of these factors are 
policy tools, e.g. reserve requirements and taxes on financial intermediation.  
These features of the Brazilian banking system have two implications for economic 
policy management. First, there are a number of policies, besides standard monetary policy, 
which can affect the cost of non-earmarked credit. Second, monetary policy does not have a 
clear impact on earmarked credit. On the contrary, this type of credit is affected by other 
economic policies, which in many cases require the use of fiscal resources. In the following 
sub-sections we discuss the main characteristics of the banking system in more detail, 
tracking its development over the previous decade, and conclude with a discussion of the 
main implications of its characteristics for macroeconomic policy.  
3.1  Segmentation of credit 
The Brazilian banking system has traditionally been characterised by the existence of different 
types of institutions (see Figure 1). Most of the banks are commercial, either public or private. 
They are deposit-taking institutions, engaged in credit provision at market interest rates, but 
they are also subject to important restrictions and provide earmarked credit to customers 
under specific programmes. There is also a large, public, development bank, BNDES, which 
was set up to foster investment projects and expedite the internationalisation of Brazilian firms 
through long-term loans at subsidised interest rates subject to a number of administrative 
restrictions and guidelines. This sort of funding is a prototype of what is known as earmarked 
credit. BNDES may operate both as a first-tier lender, directly involved in credit operations, or 
as a second-tier lender, directing funds to commercial banks. Credit allocation is, therefore, 
segmented, between earmarked and non-earmarked credit.  
Another feature of the banking system is its concentration. In 2012 around 130 
institutions held 98% of the banking system’s total assets, but the six largest banks 
accounted for 77% of its total assets and 78% of its total deposits. Of these six banks, three 
are public institutions holding 41% of the banking system’s total assets and 45% of its total 
deposits: two commercial public banks, Banco do Brasil and Caixa Economica Federal (the 
latter being the main mortgage lender with a 75% mortgage market share), and one 
development bank, BNDES.   
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The size of the Brazilian banking system substantially increased after the rapid credit 
expansion of the past decade. In 2001 loans to the non-financial private sector amounted to 
only 27.5% of GDP (see the two panels in Chart 6). Commercial banks accounted for the bulk of 
the banking system with 80% of total loans (22% of GDP). In terms of ownership, private 
institutions made up 59% of the total banking sector (16% of GDP), whereas public banks had a 
strong presence in the system with a share of 41% of all loans (11% of GDP). It is worth noting 
that the share of public banks in the system shows a negative correlation with the economic 
cycle, increasing during the economic crises of the 1980s, 1990s and the latest one.  
 
During the 2000s, year-on-year growth rates in bank loans showed a strong upward 
trend, peaking at 35% in 2008. This credit boom had two distinct phases: (1) pre-2008, 
characterised by financial deepening and non-earmarked credit expansion; and (2) post-
2008, with earmarked credit being used as a countercyclical policy tool. The first phase of 
rapid credit expansion went hand in hand with a process of private financial intermediation: 
private banks regained ground, accounting in 2007 for 65% of total credit, almost 6 pp more 
than in 2001. During the 2008/09 crisis, growth in bank loans (especially those provided by 
FIGURE 1. BANKING SECTOR STRUCTURE IN BRAZIL
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private institutions) slowed — despite a short-lived rebound in 2010 — but overall it has 
maintained an upward trend, supported by the expansion of earmarked credit used by the 
government as a countercyclical policy tool. As a result, bank loans to the non-financial sector 
more than doubled in terms of GDP in the period 2001-13, rising to 56%. The impulse of 
credit policy since 2008 has pushed the loan portfolio of public institutions up to 26% of GDP, 
with a share of 48% of total credit in 2013, a figure similar to the one observed in the crisis of 
the late 1990s. Lastly, loans by private institutions have risen to 29% of GDP, but their share 
of total credit has lost ground since the global financial crisis: in 2013 they accounted for 52% 
of total credit.  
Despite this increase in the ratio of credit to GDP, banking penetration is still low in 
Brazil compared with advanced economies where the ratios are above 100%. Nevertheless, in 
terms of GDP (PPP) per capita — which is a better measure of economic development than 
GDP — credit penetration in Brazil is high compared with other Latin American countries. In any 
case, according to De la Torre et al. (2011), credit penetration in Latin America remains below 
the level consistent with its degree of economic development (see Chart 7, Panels A and B). 
 
These two phases of credit expansion are also apparent in the reative importance of 
earmarked and non-earmarked credit (see Chart 8). Traditionally the bulk of bank credit was 
non-earmarked, freely allocated at market prices by commercial banks.  
 
CHART 7: BANKING SECTOR PENETRATION
Source: BCB; World Bank; De la Torre, Fenzen & Ize (2011); Barclays Research.
(1) Benchmark is level of financial deepening, calculated by De la Torre et al. (2011), according to economic development of country.
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Nevertheless, earmarked credit has always accounted for a large part of total credit 
(around 40% in the early 2000s) owing to government support of investment, housing, rural 
development and social inclusion. After a decade of financial deepening, earmarked credit 
lost share, falling to 32% of total credit by 2008. But during the crisis earmarked credit was 
prolifically used as a countercyclical policy tool and, therefore, now accounts for a significant 
proportion of total credit (44% at the end of 2013). 
Lastly, it is interesting to note the evolution of housing credit in Brazil as an important 
component of the earmarked credit segment (almost 30%). Its expansion began in 2005, 
driven by positive demand and supply factors. And despite the crisis, housing credit boomed 
after 2008 (see Chart 9, Panel A) following the implementation of federal programmes to 
foster investment in the housing sector. During the period 2009-12, housing credit expanded 
at increasing rates, accounting for 50% of annual growth in 2011, before moderating to 35% 
in 2012-13. At the same time, house prices rose by 25% on average and, although these 
price and credit increases have slowed recently, they have become a growing concern.  
 
Furthermore, a significant number of borrowers are low income individuals with no 
credit history, leading to fears of a sub-prime crisis. However, as suggested by Pereira and 
Harris (2012), the upswing in housing markets in Brazil is better explained by other factors, 
which include regulatory and legal changes aimed at making housing more affordable. Given 
the current shortage of available housing and the increasing wealth of the country, public 
housing programmes are unlikely to give rise to such problems in the foreseeable future. 
Furthermore, despite rapid mortgage growth, the stock of mortgage credit is still low (6% of 
GDP in 2012) and does not compromise households’ ability to pay (see Chart 9, Panel B); 
banks are well capitalised to overcome possible eventualities. For the time being, the ratio of 
troublesome to total loans remains at manageable levels, and credit portfolio losses are 
currently over-covered by banks’ loan-loss provisions.   
3.2 Large banking spreads 
The large spreads between the interest rates applied to (non-earmarked) loans and those 
paid on deposits are the second defining feature of the Brazilian banking system. Traditionally, 
high banking spreads (and consequently, high interest rates on loans) have been an important 
obstacle to credit penetration.  
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In 2001, spreads on non-earmarked credit reached 40 pp on average, with interest 
rates of 70% charged on household loans and 40% on corporate loans. The central bank 
addressed the issue by launching a programme to analyse and guide its policy decisions.8 
Banking spreads have decreased since then, along with the process of financial deepening, 
as has the cost of credit. Non-earmarked interest rates have diminished since 2001 (see 
Chart 10, Panel A), mainly owing to the reduction of the official interest rate; but at the same 
time some structural changes have driven down the equilibrium real interest rate, such as a 
decrease in the risk premium and the low inflation environment (see Banco Central do Brasil, 
2010, box entitled “Taxa de Juros Real de Equilibrio”). Banking spreads have also narrowed, 
according to the central bank, owing to lower administrative and default costs, a smaller 
impact of the compulsory allocation of credit and a fall in banking gross profits (see Chart 10, 
Panel B).  
 
Despite these trends, real interest rates and banking spreads in Brazil remain among 
the highest in the world (see Chart 11, Panels A and B). As at December 2013, spreads on 
non-earmarked credit amounted to 17.5 pp. A breakdown by type of borrower shows that 
interest rates charged on loans to households were higher (38% on average, with a spread of 
26 pp), but the cost of credit for firms was also high ( 21% on average, with a spread of 11 
pp). In contrast, earmarked credit had lower interest rates and, therefore, also lower spreads; 
as at December 2013, spreads for firms and households were 2.7 pp and 2.5 pp, 
respectively. 
Several factors, related to the cost of credit, are behind the large banking margins on 
non-earmarked credit. That cost is affected by direct and indirect taxes, administrative burdens, 
contributions to the Fundo Garantidor de Crédito9 —a deposit insurance fund — and reserve 
requirements on deposits. Accordingly, it may be said that the gap between the spreads of 
earmarked and non-earmarked credit is due, on the one hand, to a highly subsidised earmarked 
credit and, on the other, to an excessively penalised non-earmarked credit. 
                                                                          
8. The central bank issues annual reports in this respect –see Banco Central do Brasil, “Juros e Spread Bancário no 
Brasil” http://www.bcb.gov.br/?SPREAD. The decomposition presented is made using BCB methodology (2008), which 
offers certain improvements over previous research.  
9. There were four indirect taxes on credit operations: two general, the PIS (social integration programme/civil servants 
assistance programme) and the COFINS (social contribution for social security financing); and two specific, the IOF 
(financial transaction tax) and the CPMF (temporary tax on financial transactions). Two direct taxes applied to the 
financial system: income tax (IR) and the social contribution on net profits (CSLL). Moreover, there were also compulsory 
contributions to the Fundo Garantidor de Crédito. 
CHART 10: EVOLUTION OF INTEREST RATES AND BANKING SPREADS (NON-EARMARKED CREDIT)
       Source: BCB.
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The details are complex and costs may change over time, as reserve requirements 
are managed by the central bank as a means of loosening or tightening credit conditions. It 
can be argued, however, that they are high (Chart 12). This argument is supported by the fact 
that, in 2012, demand deposits were subject to a 44% unremunerated reserve requirement 
plus a 12% reserve requirement remunerated at the policy rate (the Selic rate, “sistema 
especial de liquidação e custodia”).  
 
For time deposits, the requirement amounted to 12%, and 30% for saving deposits, 
remunerated in both cases. Additionally, the existence of earmarked credit schemes to foster 
housing and rural investment also has an influence on banking spreads, since authorities 
require banks to lend a fraction of their deposits at subsidised interest rates. For instance, 
demand deposits are subject to a 29% requirement for funding rural and micro loans, roughly 
20% of time deposits have to be invested in government securities, and savings deposits are 
subject to a 65% mortgage lending requirement. These investment requirements have effects 
similar to reserve requirements on financial intermediation: they increase the cost of non-
earmarked credit as banks struggle to offset the impact on earnings.10 In fact, under this 
                                                                          
10. The system of earmarked credit mitigated market failures, but it also helped keep banking spreads high and perhaps 
crowded out the development of non-earmarked credit.     
CHART 11: INTEREST RATES AND BANKING SPREADS
Source: BCB
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system of bank requirements, only 15% of demand deposits, 68% of time deposits and 5% 
of savings deposits can be freely allocated at the banks’ discretion. 
High credit risk, explained by a number of institutional features of the Brazilian 
economy, is also identified as a relevant factor of large banking spreads. These include the 
drawbacks of an underdeveloped credit history register (mostly addressed by recent reforms, 
see below), which lacked information and increased ex ante credit risk, and the deficiencies of 
a slow legal system with a pro-debtor bias. These factors have traditionally contributed to 
create moral hazard, which has fed back into a higher risk premium. Moreover, deficiencies in 
the credit history register have helped create a captive market for banks and have increased 
interest rates. Credit risk has a straightforward effect on credit costs: it increases the risk 
premium and therefore the interest rate on loans. Lastly, according to the central bank’s 
estimates, banks have enjoyed large profits,11
Policy recommendations to address the high credit risk include: improving credit 
history registries and reducing information asymmetries (portability of information); 
improvements in the legal system, to increase the recovery rate; lowering taxes on credit and 
simplifying reserve requirements; and, in the long run, eliminating administrative restrictions on 
credit allocation. During the past decade, Brazil’s government took some steps in that 
direction. First, in 2005, the Brazilian Congress approved a new bankruptcy law designed to 
increase creditor protection and improve the efficiency of the bankruptcy system. The Law 
reduced credit risk through the establishment of a non-judicial foreclosure procedure,
 a fact which is attributed to the lack of 
competition in the banking sector.  
12 
making it easier and faster for a lender to repossess or sell a property in the event of borrower 
default. Araujo et al. (2012) find that the new regulation produced a significant increase in the 
total amount of long-term debt and a reduction of its cost. Second, in 2010 the government 
promoted new legislation to collect and maintain a “positive” credit history registry of 
consumers and firms, allowing credit information to be collected on good payers.13
3.3 Implications for monetary, credit and macro-prudential policies   
 The law 
was finally approved by the Brazilian Parliament in 2011. In principal, the creation of a Positive 
Credit Registry reduces the operational costs of risk management and, therefore, should also 
lead to a reduction in the cost of credit as good payers are identified by the registry. At the 
same time, banks may discriminate between good and bad debtors, i.e. credit scoring would 
be available, which may lower interest rates, and also increase loan maturities.   
Monetary policy has been conducted with an inflation targeting regime since 1999. The official 
interest rate (Selic rate) is raised/lowered in order to tighten/ease monetary conditions and 
dampen inflation fluctuations and credit developments. The two features of the banking 
system previously discussed —segmentation and large banking spreads— have several far- 
reaching implications for monetary policy management.  
In a nutshell, standard monetary policy has only a partial impact on the financial 
system, specifically on the cost of non-earmarked credit, as earmarked credit is linked to the 
                                                                            
11. The size of profits has to be taken with caution, as they are defined as the residual, i.e. the non-explained part of the 
spread, after deducting the effect of the other components. 
12. Non-judicial foreclosure is possible if the mortgage was originated under a new contract called “alienaçao fiduiciária”. 
This is a type of secured real estate transaction through which borrowers transfer the legal title of properties used as 
collateral to the trustee, who holds the property in trust for the use and benefit of the borrowers. If borrowers default on 
the terms of their loan, the trustee may take full control of the property and sell it without court proceedings.  
13. Brazil already has a system for collecting and storing data on “bad creditors”, i.e. credit information on borrowers 
who are delinquent in their payment obligations (for example, the databases managed by SPC Brazil and Serasa 
Experian).   
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“official” long-term interest rate (Taxa de Juros de Longo Plazo, TJLP) and, therefore, is not 
directly influenced by monetary policy decisions. The TJLP is set each quarter by the National 
Monetary Council and calculated according to two parameters: the official inflation target for 
the next twelve months, plus a risk premium which incorporates an international real interest 
rate plus a (Brazil) country-specific risk from a long-term perspective. The TJLP is much lower 
than the central bank’s official interest rate (Selic rate) which guides the cost of non-
earmarked credit (see Chart 13, Panel A) and much less volatile. In fact during 2013 the TJLP 
was held constant at 5%, despite the market turbulence and the increase in the financing 
cost —and the market’s country risk perception— of Brazil. 
Accordingly, the central bank has a limited influence on the Brazilian banking system 
(non-earmarked credit). In turn, earmarked credit is basically influenced by administrative 
decisions, i.e. credit policies settled by the federal government, which can directly stimulate 
credit growth (earmarked credit) irrespective of how loose or tight the monetary policy stance 
may be (see Chart 13, Panels A and B). In this scenario, policy inconsistencies may emerge if 
monetary and credit policy stances differ, as seen in 2013 when public credit expanded and 
monetary policy tightened.  
 
Credit growth, especially after 2008, reflects to a large extent the deliberate efforts of 
the economic authorities to foster credit in specific sectors, basically through the activity of 
BNDES or programmes to address the housing shortage14 (see Chart 14, Panel A). 
Earmarked credit aims to correct market failures: various mechanisms are set in place to 
provide subsidised credit to certain sectors, given their strategic importance or the existence 
of severe credit rationing.15  
                                                                          
14. A normative analysis of the growth of earmarked credit in recent years is complex, as it requires detailed information 
on market failures and their evolution over the cycle. The extensive activity of BNDES helped mitigate the risks of a credit 
crunch, but posed important risks in other dimensions. Similar caution is also advisable when analysing the programme 
to foster housing investment: it can help mitigate the housing shortage, but it also poses risks. Development banks and 
measures to foster credit to certain sectors have merits, as they can fill a gap in the market, but their activity also poses 
risks, and can prevent the development of the banking system, as they compete with commercial banks and may 
eventually crowd out their activity.     
15. Nevertheless, as proposed by De Barros and Latif (2013), earmarked credit has been part of a broader rent-seeking 
scheme included in a government intervention project called “National Developmentalism” which itself introduces market 
failures. See Bielschowsky (1995) for a comprehensive explanation of the “National Developmentalism” idelology.   
0
15
30
45
60
75
90
105
120
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Jan-01 Jan-03 Jan-05 Jan-07 Jan-09 Jan-11 Jan-13
pppp
A. Cost of credit (Interest rates)
SELIC Rate
TJLP (Official long-term rate - base 
earmarked rate)
Source: BCB and BNDES.
CHART 13. CREDIT COST (INTEREST RATES) AND GROWTH
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Q1 2002 Q1 2004 Q1 2006 Q1 2008 Q1 2010 Q1 2012
%% yoy
B. Credit growth
Total/GDP (right 
axis)
Non-earmarked
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1405 
Almost half of all earmarked credit is granted by BNDES. During the crisis, 
disbursements by BNDES practically tripled (see Chart 14, Panel B), reaching BRL 156 billion 
a year. But even before the crisis, BNDES was an important development bank at an 
international level. In 2007 it managed funds amounting to to BRL 202 billion, almost double 
the loans granted by the Inter-American Development Bank. BNDES’s activity has traditionally 
focused on supporting industrial development programmes and infrastructure projects that 
would not be funded otherwise, concentrating on specific sectors, e.g. investment in capital 
goods, infrastructures and exports (see Chart 15, Panel A); it is also involved in equity 
investments in strategic firms (equity, private equity and venture capital).  
BNDES traditionally obtains resources from public funds (Fondo de Amparo de 
Trabajadores, FAT; Fondo General de los Trabajadores, FGTS), taxes (on wages, 
PSI/PASEP), debt issuance in domestic and international markets and transfers from the 
Treasury. It also obtains resources from multilateral organisations. The FAT was traditionally 
the main source of financing —at least 40% of its resources are transferred to BNDES—, but 
since the latest crisis the Treasury has become the main creditor (see Chart 15, Panel B). This 
extraordinary expansion of BNDES’ portfolio in the aftermath of the crisis was mainly financed 
by the Treasury as part of a loosening quasi-fiscal policy. Thus, during the crisis, BNDES’ 
traditional role of promoting investment was reinforced but, at the same time, the institution 
was used as a countercyclical policy instrument. In this sense, credit expansion by BNDES 
was instrumental in avoiding the risks of a credit crunch. More strikingly, BNDES’ activity will 
remain strong after the recovery takes hold: according to budgetary plans, BNDES will be the 
major lender in infrastructure investment programmes in coming years.  
 
Credit granted by BNDES is rationed, i.e. demand is higher than supply at the given 
price, fixed administratively. This implies that the authorities have an additional policy tool: the 
transfers made by the Treasury to BNDES. These transfers constitute an important policy 
tool, somewhere between fiscal and financial policy. The latter, because they determine credit 
conditions and have an important impact on credit (in this respect they have also become 
complementary to monetary policy). They are also akin to budgetary policy, because they 
require transfers from tax authorities and are therefore linked to fiscal policy. In fact, the 
CHART 14: BANKING CREDIT ALLOCATION AND BNDES DISBURSEMENTS
Source: BCB and BNDES.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Total 
credit (1)
Earmarked (3) Rural (b)
% GDP
A. Bank credit: allocation by purpose
Dec-00 Dec-08 Dec-13
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Oct. 
2013
B. BNDES disbursements
Disbursements
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1405 
difference between the subsidised interest rate and the funding cost of the Treasury is 
included in the calculation of the total fiscal balance.16  
 
Earmarked credit also comprises some commercial banks’ lending activities. 
Commercial banks are subject to a number of administrative restrictions and have to invest 
part of their liabilities (deposits) in certain sectors —housing and agriculture— at preferential 
rates, usually linked to the TJLP. For instance, mortgage loans are funded with earmarked 
resources coming from (i) a compulsory reserve requirement of 65% over saving deposits 
(more details below), and (ii) funds provided by the public pension system (Fundo de Garantia 
do Tempo de Serviço). Investment in housing is traditionally governed by the Sistema 
Financeiro da Habitação (SFH), established in 1964 to promote housing sector funding.17 The 
Sistema Nacional de Crédito Rural (SNCR), set up in 1967, is designed to improve financing 
conditions for the rural sector.18 Additionally, spreads on earmarked credit are also fixed 
administratively. At the end of the day, its cost is much lower than that of non-earmarked 
credit, whose spreads are extremely large, as discussed above. 
Housing credit is another major segment of earmarked credit. Due to the 
implementation of federal programmes to encourage investment in the housing sector, 
housing credit boomed after 2008 and by 2012 accounted for approximately one-third of 
earmarked credit. Launched in 2009, Minha Casa Minha Vida is the main programme to 
                                                                          
16. Public debt interest payments by the Treasury are accounted as fiscal spending in the calculation of the total fiscal 
balance. Nevertheless, in order to achieve more transparent and reliable fiscal accounts, the difference between the 
subsidised interest rates and the market interest rates —the real cost of the subsidised credit— should be entered as 
expenditure in the calculation of the primary balance, as that difference is actually a public transfer to the private sector 
through the banking system, which lends those funds at subsidised interest rates. Considering that the TJLP is currently 
5% and the market Selic rate (a proxy of the funding cost of the Treasury) is 9%, a lower bound estimation of the fiscal 
cost of this credit policy would be around BRL 12 billion, i.e. 0.34% of GDP (in 2012, BNDES’ liabilities with the Treasury 
amounted to BRL 376 billion). 
17. The Sistema Financeiro de Habitaçao (SFH) was established by Law 4380/64 as a set of rules and institutions 
designed to promote housing credit. The resources were obtained from the Sistema Brasileiro de Poupança e 
Empréstimo (SBPE) and the Fundo de Garantia do Tempo de Serviço (FGTS). The SBPE, established in 1964, 
comprises financial institutions which obtain saving deposits and channel them under the rules of the Conselho 
Monetário Nacional (CNM). The FGTS, established in 1966, was intended to save resources in order to provide benefits 
for the unemployed. 
18. The SNCR obtains resources from different sources, particularly from the National Treasury, and compulsory 
requirements on sight deposits. The latter regulation stresses that banks have to choose between a) holding 25% of their 
sight deposits as unremunerated reserves at the central bank, and b) lending to the agricultural sector, also at 
subsidised rates.  
Source: BCB and BNDES
* Resources from FAT (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabajhador) directed to the financing of economic development programs through BNDES. 
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promote access to housing for millions of low-/middle-income Brazilian families. The federal 
administration offers mortgages at subsidised interest rates and long terms to developers and 
buyers through the state bank Caixa Economica Federal, the country’s largest mortgage 
lender with a 72% market share.  
Finally, banking spreads and interest rates (especially of non-earmarked credit) can 
be affected by a number of policy tools besides standard monetary policy, which are usually 
included under the umbrella of macro-prudential policies, such as reserve requirements, taxes 
on financial intermediation or administrative restrictions on credit allocation. These polices 
have frequently been used to ease or tighten credit conditions and have, in fact, been key 
factors behind the process of credit expansion. In other words, there is room for other 
policies, such as quantitative monetary policy and macro-prudential policies, in addition to 
orthodox monetary policy (policy rate management). For instance, during the period 2008-12, 
reserve requirements were tightened or eased by the central bank in order to provide stability 
(liquidity) to the financial system or modulate the risk of excessive credit growth. In particular, 
from 2010, with the focus on mitigating the systemic risk posed by the rapid credit expansion, 
the central bank, besides adjusting short-term interest rates, tightened the reserve 
requirements on demand and time deposits, imposed higher capital ratios for long-term loans 
to households and increased the rate of the financial transaction tax (IOF). Those measures 
had an impact on the cost, terms and volume of new loans, moderating the demand and 
volume of non-earmarked credit (see Chart 16, Panels A and B). 
 
As a consequence of all those developments market distortions remain, reflected in 
the increasing participation of public banks and earmarked credit in the loan portfolio of the 
banking system and in the existence of interest rate spreads between private and public 
banks. Whereas the first is correlated with the economic cycle (and the role of public credit as 
a countercyclical policy tool) and should moderate somewhat as economic growth takes hold 
(as seen in past episodes), the second seems to imply a public policy trying to reduce the 
high levels of interest rates. Although this is a desirable target, market dynamics, efficiency 
and competition are usually more robust drivers of interest rate reductions than policy 
intervention.  
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4 Concluding remarks 
The Brazilian economy has improved significantly in recent decades. Especially relevant are 
the improvements in its macroeconomic policy framework, which have allowed for greater 
economic stability and have made room for countercyclical policy management of crises. 
After a challenging phase of institutional reforms initiated in the early 2000s, the public sector 
now displays primary fiscal surpluses and a reinforced commitment to fiscal discipline. Net 
debt has trended downward, driven by primary surpluses and GDP growth. And debt 
management has helped improve debt composition, making public finances less vulnerable: 
the public debt structure is currently characterised by lower indexation, longer maturities and 
higher levels of international reserves. Thus, the traditional constraints imposed on 
macroeconomic policy by the public debt structure have largely been removed: the public 
sector has become a net creditor in foreign currency (helped at the same time by the huge 
accumulation of international reserves) and there is no negative effect of exchange rate 
depreciation on debt dynamics as there are no currency mismatches.  
Regarding monetary policy, the inflation targeting regime introduced in 1999 has 
been successful in containing inflation, which has generally remained within the central bank’s 
targets, and hyperinflation is no longer a risk. Nevertheless, the rate of inflation is still high 
compared to peers, possibly affected by supply-side constraints, excessive labour cost 
growth and low productivity.  
Additionally, monetary policy is conducted within an atypical banking system 
which retains most of its traditional defining features. Credit allocation remains 
segmented. Indeed, direct credit provision by public banks has increased substantially in 
the wake of the global financial crisis. Accordingly, the short-term policy interest rate has 
a direct impact on only a fraction of total credit. Therefore, in order to correctly assess 
monetary policy, other quantitative measures, such as reserve requirements, must also 
be monitored. Banking spreads remain high by international standards, despite the 
efforts of the central bank to reduce them, and many of their traditional underlying 
determinants remain in place.  
In any event, thanks to the lower vulnerabilities and increased credibility achieved 
in recent decades, Brazil was able to cope with a huge real and financial shock during the 
global economic and financial crisis. The leeway available for countercyclical policies in the 
wake of the global crisis suggests that the efforts made to pursue sound policies have paid 
off: the country remained resilient. However, major challenges remain, such as the 
drawbacks preventing growth potential from being unlocked, in particular the lack of 
infrastructure, the inadequate provision of public services and the challenge of increasing 
financial deepening to a level appropriate to the economic development of the country. This 
last factor is closely related to the functioning of the banking system and the high cost of 
non-earmarked credit. 
While the behaviour of the Brazilian economy in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
has been notable, this has not prevented the recent build-up of economic and financial 
vulnerabilities, for instance, a widening current account deficit and the increase in non-
financial corporations’ foreign currency debt. The return of procyclical policies, that is, the 
need to conduct a restrictive monetary policy in recent years, against the backdrop of 
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exchange rate depreciation and a slowing economy, is a timely reminder that the overall 
economic policy framework —in particular in the area of structural policies— still requires 
further improvement.  
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